Pakistan’s nuclear weapons: a whole picture view
Designed in response to regional challenges, particularly from India, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is a pillar of its national security approach. Pakistan has maintained a policy of credible minimum deterrence despite under international attention over safety and proliferation issues since turning into a nuclear-armed state in 1998. The historical evolution, strategic theory, command and control systems, hazards to regional stability, and worldwide worries over Pakistan’s nuclear capability are discussed in this paper.
1. Development of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program Historically
After losing the 1971 war with India, Pakistan began looking for nuclear weapons; India’s first test conducted in 1974 (“Smiling Buddha”). Key benchmarks consist:
1972: Starting the nuclear program, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said, “We will eat grass but make a nuclear bomb.”
1980s: Uranium enrichment was facilitated by covert procurement network run by Dr. A.Q. Khan.
1998: Responding to India’s Pokhran-II tests, Pakistan carried six nuclear tests (“Chagai-I” and “Chagai-II”).
2. Pakistan’s nuclear policy: credible minimum deterrent
Pakistan has adopted a flexible deterrent posture unlike India’s “No First Use” (NFU) policy, therefore preserving the right to utilize nuclear weapons first should a massive conventional strike be started. Key elements consist:
Full-spectrum deterrence: Covering tactical (short-range) and strategic (long-range) weapons is full-spectrum deterrent.
Second-strike capability: Ensuring survivability by use of missile-equipped submarines—such as Babur-class
India-centric focus: Weapons like the Nasr (60km range) challenge India’s “Cold Start” philosophy.
Command and Control: Safety vs. Proliferation Risks
Under direction of the Prime Minister, Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) monitors nuclear facilities. Protections consist in:
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP): Vetting of military personnel.
Decentralized access to storage: Systems of delivery and warheads kept apart.
Still, there are questions because of:
Historical leaks: A.Q. Khan’s proliferation to North Korea, Libya, and Iran.
Threats related to terrorism: worries about insider knowledge or group theft like TTP.
Impact on Regional Stability: Arms Race in South Asia
The India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry has led to:
- Increased militarization: Both states are expanding arsenals (Pakistan has ~170 warheads; India ~160).
- Crisis instability: Close calls like the 2001-2002 standoff and 2019 Balakot crisis.
- China’s role: As Pakistan’s ally, China’s assistance in missile tech (e.g., MIRVs) complicates the balance.
5. Global Issues and Upcoming Difficulties
Global concerns consist in: Pakistan continues to be outside both treaties, citing non-compliance by India.
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT): Pakistan rejects talks out of concern about disadvantage.
U.S. and Western sanctions: Current FATF examination combined with past limitations (1998 sanctions).
Conclusion
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are a two-edged blade: they guarantee security but also invite worldwide scrutiny. Future depends on confidence-building with India, more robust defenses, and arms control talks. In absence of regional collaboration, nuclear conflict looms big over South Asia.
FAQs
1. Why does Pakistan now have nuclear weapons?
Reacting to India’s nuclear tests (1974 and 1998) and conventional military supremacy, Pakistan largely sought nuclear weapons. The loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971 motivated Pakistan far more in search of a deterrent against approaching threats.
2. Pakistan’s nuclear policy is what?
Pakistan maintains its right to use nuclear weapons first should a significant conventional attack from India be started using a first-use option and a theory of “credible minimum deterrence.” India’s “No First Use” (NFU) policy stands in contrast here.
3. Is Pakistan included in international nuclear treaties like the NPT or CTBT?
Not number. Pakistan: Calls the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) unfair and has not signed it.
Objects the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) unless India signs first.
Opposes the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) citing worries of an imbalance with India.